Does cultural evolution happen by a process of copying or replication? And how exactly does cultural transmission compare with that paradigmatic case of replication, the copying of DNA in living cells? Theorists of cultural evolution are divided on these issues. The most important objection to the replication model has been leveled by Dan Sperber and his colleagues. Cultural transmission, they argue, is almost always reconstructive and transformative, while strict 'replication' can be seen as a rare limiting case at most. By means of some thought experiments and intuition pumps, I clear up some confusion about what qualifies as 'replication'. I propose a distinction between evocation and extraction of cultural information, applying these concepts at different levels of resolution. I defend a purely abstract and information-theoretical definition of replication, while rejecting more material conceptions. In the end, even after taking Sperber's valuable and important points on board, the notion of cultural replication remains a valid and useful one. This is fortunate, because we need it for certain explanatory projects (e.g., understanding cumulative cultural adaptations).
Introduction
Many discussions in the burgeoning field of cultural evolution still revolve-in one way or another-around the scope and limitations of the analogy with biological evolution (Lewens 2015; Mesoudi 2011; Buskes 2013; Claidière et al. 2014; Mesoudi et al. 2006 ). How Darwinian is cultural evolution exactly? Is it cumulative, as in the biological realm? Is it blind or guided? Does the phenotype/ genotype distinction hold in the cultural domain? What, if anything, is the cultural equivalent of a 'mutation'? Perhaps one of the most contentious points of comparison is this: Does cultural evolution happen through a process of replication (or copying/imitation)? Most famously, the notion of replication is associated with 'memes', the cultural counterpart of genes proposed by Richard Dawkins in The Selfish Gene (1976) . According to Dawkins and others, memes play the role of the replicator in the cultural realm, analogous to genes in the biological realm (Blackmore 2000; Dennett 1995 Dennett , 2017 .
Many authors have disputed the usefulness of 'replicators' and replication in the cultural domain. Jablonka and Lamb (2014) have argued that the concept of cultural replicators ignores the role of learning and developmental construction. Others reject the idea that culture can be broken down into discrete, gene-like units (Bloch 2000; Mesoudi 2011 ), or object that there is no cultural analogue for genetic codes and DNA replication machinery (Lewens 2015; Acerbi and Mesoudi 2015) . Henrich and his colleagues, for their part, have argued that the whole issue of 'replication' is a distraction, as cumulative cultural evolution works perfectly well without discrete, gene-like replicators (Henrich et al. 2008 ; see also Nanay 2011). One of the most forceful objections against the replication model of culture has come from Dan Sperber. For many years, Sperber and his colleagues have argued that culture does not evolve by straightforward replication, despite what the superficial analogy between genes and memes might suggest (Atran 2001; Boyer 1994; Claidière et al. 2014; Heintz and Claidière 2015; Scott-Phillips 2015; Sperber 1996 Sperber , 2000 . In the cultural realm, replication is a limiting case at best, applicable to only a few isolated phenomena. In all other cases, cultural transmission involves heavy doses of transformation and reconstruction on the basis of prior knowledge. This poses a serious problem for memes. According to Lewens (2015, p. 27 ) and many others, the memetic approach to culture is committed to "a strict process of replication", and is therefore immediately ruled out as a serious contender for studying culture. But Sperber's objections to memes may have wider consequences. Some approaches in cultural evolution may well disavow meme-talk, but they still rely on a conception of culture as consisting of discrete units that undergo a process of reproduction and selection (e.g., Hull 1990; O'Brien et al. 2010 ). Thus, they may also fall prey to Sperber's objection (for a discussion of memetic versus selectionist approaches, see Lewens 2015, Sect. 4.1) .
In this paper, I develop a conceptual analysis of the term "replication" in both the cultural and the biological realm, defending a purely abstract and information-theoretical approach. In order to understand the sense in which genes can be treated as 'replicators', we have to think of them in terms of abstract mathematical information, rather than physical substrates. Once we adopt this definition and extrapolate it to culture, some important objections against cultural "replication" evaporate. By means of some thought experiments, I make a distinction between evocation and extraction of cultural information, applying these concepts at different levels of abstraction.
Amusing mathematicians
A group of mathematicians like to tell jokes to enliven their conference dinners. Because they have known each other for such a long time, and being avid humorists, they decide to design a more efficient system for their amusement. They assign numbers to each joke in their repertoire, so that they can save time and just call out that number. So the next night at a conference dinner, the first mathematician shouts out: "56!" Boisterous laughter from around the table. The second mathematician has a go: "532!" Everyone cracks up again. A third mathematician shouts "345!" Just a few chuckles and groans, with the exception of one young mathematician, who is rolling over the floor laughing. The third joke-teller turns over to the rookie and asks him: "So at least one of you folks liked my last joke, right?" The young one snickers: "It's just that I had never heard that one before!" I am not sure where this joke originated, but for all I know it could have been dreamt up by Dan Sperber or one of his collaborators, because it nicely illustrates an important insight of theirs about cultural evolution.
1 Many models of cultural evolution assume more or less by default that, whenever we see chains of identical or similar representations in a cultural environment, some sort of replication must be going on. But the joke about the mathematicians shows why this assumption is wrongheaded. Their system of amusement is not based on straightforward replication. The joke teller does not transmit a full-blown joke, but just selects one from the repertoire and calls out its number, thus bringing about a similar representation in the minds of the receivers. The process does look like replication, however, because there is a causal arrow going from sender to receiver, supported by the usual counterfactuals. For example, if you mishear the number being called out, you will end up with a different mental representation. But the numbers themselves are not funny. They provoke laughter only because they elicit some previously stored, fully formed semantic content. For the system to work, every participant already needs all the jokes stored in memory, along with the corresponding numbers.
2 This, of course, is the point of the punch line: if you start laughing, you must have heard the joke before.
Sperber himself illustrates the point with a different thought experiment. Imagine you see a sequence of tape recorders: the first recorder plays a song, then stops. A few seconds later the second recorder in line starts playing the same song. When it has finished, the third sets in, and so forth. If you witness this string of events, you may reasonably infer that the devices are recording and then replaying a song. In other words, there seems to be a process of replication going on. But then it is revealed that the sound-recorders already have a repertoire of songs stored in memory, and they have merely been "activated by the sound of the last five bars of any melody in their repertoire" (Sperber 2000, p. 169) . After the first recorder stops playing, the second recorder identifies the song and retrieves it from its internal memory. No replication is taking place, even though a naive observer might be forgiven for thinking so. Returning to human beings, we could imagine-ruining our punchline-that people are born with an innate repertoire of jokes, each of which can be triggered by a certain stimulus (hearing a call-out number). In this way, we can imagine a Chinese whisper chain of people amusing each other with jokes, even though no transmission is going on (or hardly any).
It goes without saying that Sperber and his colleagues are not suggesting that humans are born with an innate repertoire of jokes, or, for that matter, with any other complex representations. But still, this is a useful limiting case to think about cultural transmission. In general terms, Sperber proposes three "minimal conditions for true replication". For B to be a copy of A, 1. B must be caused by A (together with background conditions) 2. B must be similar in relevant respects to A 3. The process that generates B must obtain the information that makes B similar to A from A. (Sperber 2000, p. 169)
The third condition is the crucial one, and is generally not fulfilled in the cultural domain, and certainly not in our scenario about the mathematicians. In a typical act of communication or social learning, people do not copy representations directly, but "reconstruct" them on the basis of knowledge they already possess, whether that knowledge is innate, has been acquired earlier, or is embodied in the environment: "information provided by the stimulus is complemented with information already available in the system" (Sperber 2000, p. 171) . Although Sperber does not define his notion of "information", I think his discussion of triggering makes most sense in the context of the mathematical definition of 'information' (Shannon 1948 (Shannon /2001 , and I will rely on this definition to develop my own distinction between evocation and extraction (see below).
3 In this mathematical sense, information, roughly speaking, can be seen as a measure of surprise. For instance, in the case of Sperber's triggered tape recorders, the 'receiver' already has the full song stored in memory, so the message is not 'surprising', containing no information. Similarly, if you listen to a joke you have heard before, the message carries no new information (for you). But a novel joke has the ability to surprise you, because it does contain new information (for you).
In any event, without the availability of some prior knowledge, cultural transmission could not succeed in the first place. Public expressions or displays of culture almost always underdetermine the representation being transmitted. In the extreme case of the mathematicians, an observer can immediately see this, even without knowing the details of their communication system. A three-digit number cannot store all the semantic content that goes into a joke. If the mathematicians end up laughing in concert (presumably entertained by the same joke), that must be because the semantic content in question was already available to them prior to the callingout. Even when a joke is spelled out in the ordinary way, however, successful transmission depends on substantial prior knowledge on the part of the listeners: mastery of the language in which the joke is related (vocabulary, pronunciation, grammar), but also folk psychological knowledge, familiarity with the conventions of joketelling, and perhaps also background knowledge about politics, social stereotypes, or sex. In a successful recounting of a joke, the utterances of the joke-teller should provide enough clues (but not too many) for the audience to reconstruct the intended meaning and 'get' the punchline.
If we are trying to explain the existence of stable cultural traditions through time, we therefore have to take into account the contributions made by evoked information as well as transmitted information. For instance, some representations achieve wide dissemination mainly by virtue of certain universal cognitive predispositions and biases. In the cultural selection tournament, some representations will therefore be more salient, memorable, and inferentially rich to the human mind than others. In Sperber's framework, "cultural attractors" are locations in the space of possible representations that are maximally relevant, from a cognitive point of view. In a cultural population, shared representations will gravitate towards those attractors: "to some extent all humans, and to a greater extent all members of the same population at any one time, are attracted in the same direction" (Sperber 1996, p. 118) . In his book on cultural traditions, Morin (2015) has proposed a spectrum between "evoked" and "transmitted" culture. If the mathematicians in our joke were to play a game of Chinese whispers, making use of their coding system, the stability of the transmission chain would be mostly a function of evocation, not transmission. We would find ourselves at the 'evoked' end of Morin's spectrum, just like in the case of the sound recorders in Sperber's thought experiment. Other cultural traditions may be closer to the "transmitted" end of the spectrum, but probably no cultural traditions can persist without at least some element of evocation.
Reconstructing and decoding
Sperber and his colleagues are completely right to call our attention to the role of evocation and reconstruction in cultural traditions. If we see a chain of similar and causally connected representations, we should not assume by default that some process of straightforward replication is going on. In Sperber's words, cultural theorists should not "take for granted that the co-occurrence of causation and of similarity between cause and effect is sufficient evidence of inheritance" (Sperber 2000, p. 169) . Apart from this conceptual point, I also grant that Sperber is probably right about the empirical facts. In human culture, virtually every form of cultural transmission involves at least some element of evocation. The respective contributions of transmission and evocation may differ, but the stability of cultural traditions is never exhaustively explained by transmission alone. Now let me proceed to the areas of disagreement. Imagine that our mathematicians have devised a slightly different way of telling jokes. Suppose they are particularly fond of dirty jokes, but they prefer not to be overheard by certain colleagues with more delicate sensibilities. Rather than assigning numbers to a fixed inventory of jokes, they have devised a numerical code. Each number that is called out corresponds to a specific joke, as before, but this time the code is generative. Novel as well as old jokes can be encrypted. Now suppose that we have a transmission chain of mathematicians, like in the Chinese whisper game. Each mathematician communicates a certain number to his neighbor, who then reconstructs the semantic content, and proceeds to 'tell' the same joke to the next one in line.
In many respects, the new scenario resembles the original. A joke-teller utters a number, the receiver 'gets' the joke and cracks up. In both cases, a listener cannot appreciate the jokes without prior possession of substantial knowledge. If you don't know either the code or the inventory, you will not end up with the original representation in your mind, and communication will fail. Despite appearances, no straightforward copying is taking place, but rather a complicated process of reconstruction on the basis of prior knowledge.
In some crucial respects, however, our new situation is clearly different from the first. Even though the jokes are being reconstructed on the basis of prior knowledge, as in the first scenario, this time it is perfectly possible that some mathematician listening to the encrypted joke had indeed 'never heard it before'. I propose that we can treat the second system of communication, unlike the first, as a form of replication, despite the fact that it relies on heavy doses of reconstruction, and does not involve a straightforward copying mechanism. The main motivation behind this proposal is pragmatic. If we are studying the dissemination of a particular joke in a population of mathematicians, it does not really matter exactly how 'replication' is achieved. Whether the joke-tellers are spelling out the jokes in the usual way, or using some sort of elaborate code, we will observe the same processes of dissemination, mutation, cultural attraction, and branching of lineages. As long as the encryption system is faithful and reliable, we can stand back and abstract away from the precise copying mechanism. Notice that we can not afford to do that with Sperber's sound recorders, or with the first scenario involving the mathematicians. If we black-box the machines and treat them as replication devices, then our explanatory projects are bound to go awry. For instance, a theorist black-boxing the sound recorders might be led to the prediction that mutations and noise in the "transmission" chain will accumulate over time, and lineages will start to evolve. But this would be factually wrong: the sound-recorders will keep playing the same song over and over again. There might be noise or glitches in each performance, but those will not accumulate.
As a real-life example of the second scenario, consider the famous Enigma code employed by Nazi Germany during the Second World War. Enigma encryption was carried out by an electro-mechanical cipher machine, and was based on a substitution scheme for each letter in a given message. It was also coordinated by an elaborate system of constantly changing routines. In order to extract the intended message on the receiving end, substantial prior 'knowledge' was required. First of all, the receiver needs to have another Enigma machine to decipher the message, but she also needs to know the exact instructions for setting it up, as well as the daily changing coding routines. Because the British intelligence agencies intercepting the German messages lacked such prior knowledge, they could not decipher them.
Does the Enigma system for communication qualify as a form of replication? In many respects, Enigma communication is behaviorally indistinguishable from 'true' replication (however defined), as indeed it was designed to be by the German cryptographers who created it. In the interest of military victory, the message coming out at the receiving end (e.g., plans for military maneuvers) had indeed better be an exact copy of the original. For a military historian interested in cultural transmission chains, it would have made no difference if the Germans had used a difference system of communication, or indeed if they had relayed uncoded messages (though of course that would have been strategic suicide).
If all these examples can be regarded as "replication", as I propose, then it seems that replication turns out to be perfectly compatible with heavy reconstruction on the basis of prior knowledge. Even though the information of the stimulus is "complemented with information already available in the system", in Sperber's words, and even though the transmission chain would break down completely in the absence of such prior information, both scenarios still fulfill Sperber's third minimal condition of replication: "The process that generates B must obtain the information that makes B similar to A from A." (Sperber 2000, p. 169) . It seems that Sperber is too demanding about what constitutes proper replication, a point that was also made by Lewens (2015, p. 28) . For Lewens, we can talk about replication in the cultural domain as soon as "a given idea [is] causally responsible for the structure of a resembling daughter idea".
4 Because Sperber's concept of "reconstruction" is ambiguous in this regard, I propose instead to distinguish between evocation and extraction. In a case of evocation, the final representation is already available to the receiver and is merely being triggered by some simple stimulus. 5 No transmission is taking place (except for the trigger), and thus no replication is happening. In the case of extraction, by contrast, prior knowledge on the part of the receiver serves to recreate or decode the transmitted representation, not to evoke some previously stored representation. In the case of extraction, the message itself is novel and surprising to the receiver, even though the transmission process is elaborate and indirect. (Below, I apply these concepts to different levels of abstraction.) 4 If Lewens wants to maintain this relaxed notion of "replication" throughout, however, it is hard to see why he still dismisses memes, which clearly fulfill his definition. A meme gets 'replicated' when it is causally responsible for the occurrence of another cultural representation that is sufficiently similar to be treated as an instantiation of the same 'meme'. 5 Defined in this way, "evocation" should be distinguished from Tooby and Cosmides' concept of "evoked culture" (Tooby and Cosmides 1994) , which more narrowly refers to the role of innate cognitive mechanisms in bringing about cultural representations. My concept of "evocation" is broader. As the example of the mathematicians shows, information that is "evoked" need not be innate. It is possible that it was simply acquired or transmitted at an earlier point.
Information and redundancy demons
My proposal relies on an abstract and information-theoretical conception of cultural representations. In the second scenario of the mathematicians, but not the first, there is a significant transfer of information, in line with Shannon's (1948 Shannon's ( /2001 conception of information as a reduction of uncertainty. The extracted semantic content is 'surprising' to the receiver, assuming he has not heard the joke before. In the first scenario, by contrast, there is hardly any reduction of uncertainty, except for the few bits of information involved in the current choice from the repertoire. This, of course, will be reflected by the length of the called-out numbers. In the original situation, the listener only needs a few bits to "reconstruct" the semantic content of the joke. In the second scenario, however, the numbers need to be significantly longer, as each individual word in the joke needs to be conveyed.
Some cultural theorists resist this purely abstract approach to cultural representations in terms of information. Rather than identifying cultural representation with information, they are looking for some sort of physical entity or structure that is being copied, such as brain states, behaviors, tools, sound waves, etc. (Aunger 2002) . Many of them see DNA replication as a paradigm case of 'proper' replication, because this process at least involves an identifiable and straightforward causal mechanism. Consequently, when they are talking about 'replication', they are thinking of some sort of straightforward physical mechanism for duplicating a physical object, structure, or pattern. Other theorists seem to endorse the information-theoretical conception of culture, but fail to maintain this perspective throughout, and sometimes (covertly) fall back on a more material conception. In his insightful book on cultural transmission, for example, Morin writes: "Can traditions be identified with the information that is passed on when they are transmitted? No, not always. Just because cultural transmission involves an exchange of ideas does not mean that traditions themselves are the ideas that their proliferation relies on." (Morin 2015, p. 49, italics in original). But it seems that Morin is sliding from "information" to "conceptual idea" here, as is also visible a few pages earlier when he rejects the default conception that "culture is a set of socially transmitted representations (or bits of information)" (2015, p. 47) . Morin is right that culture does not merely consist of ideas (mental representations), but also physical artefacts, behaviours and perceptual patterns (e.g., sound waves). But this does not compromise the informational conception of culture. Physical artefacts instantiate information no less than neural structures. Defenders of the informational view argue that, in all these cases, it is useful to equate culture with the information instantiated by the material carrier, rather than with the material carrier itself. 6 Consistent with his more material approach, Morin has also rejected the "reduction of genes to information" (personal communication, 2017) . If genes are mere information, asks Morin, does it follow that we can send our genome through the internet? Yes. According to a strictly informational conception, "genes" can indeed be saved on a flash disk or e-mailed (see Dennett 2011) . For Morin, this is a reductio ad absurdum of the strictly informational point of view, but I in fact welcome the conclusion. The informational view also works both ways: Researchers have recently succeeded in encoding a digitized video clip into the DNA of a bacterium (Shipman et al. 2017) .
Take the paradigm case of replication, DNA copying. As George Williams and others have argued, genes should not be identified with physical molecules, but rather with the information residing in those molecules (Williams 1992; Durham 1991; Haig 2007) . It is tempting to think that the entity being copied is the physical DNA molecule itself. DNA, after all, is a discrete and visible physical entity. But on the informational approach, the only thing that matters is that some piece of abstract information (a digital sequence) is recreated in a different physical environment. Even though the mechanism responsible for replication of genes is relatively straightforward and simple, this is not a necessary requirement to justify talk about 'replication'.
A thought experiment will help to show this. Imagine that the replication of genetic information in our bodies is carried out by a cohort of tiny agents. Let's call them Redundancy Demons. During cell division, the demons unwind a DNA strand, communicate the sequence to each other, and then re-assemble a complement DNA string base by base (think of plastic toy models of DNA used for educational purposes). The Redundancy Demons are extremely diligent and achieve almost perfect fidelity, just as in the actual world we live in. Does this qualify as replication? Ex hypothesi, the demons' labor would be indistinguishable from "true" replication. It is logically possible that such demons are at work as we speak, just as some 'sophisticated' theologians have suggested that God is secretly fiddling with our DNA, all the while making sure that He stays below the threshold of statistical detectability (Haught 2000; Miller 2000) . And we could easily make our thought experiment more fanciful, without changing the basic point. Even if it were discovered that Redundancy Demons use a range of different molecules for encrypting the genetic information, rather than the four known nucleobases in DNA strings (ACGT), that would not make any difference in practice, as long as the information is still somehow transcribed to the right amino acid sequences. And what if they used tiny Enigma machines for secrecy, decoding the information in each transmission event? None of this would make a difference from the informational point of view, and none of it would compromise the evolutionary algorithm of variation and selection. To all intents and purposes, what is going on would still be "replication".
Level of resolution
What are the Redundancy Demons copying? Information of course, just like natural DNA copying mechanisms in the real world. But information is not a given in the world. It needs to be identified, and this can happen at different levels of resolution. Even in this paradigm case of replication, we need to settle on the right level of analysis to identify the information being replicated. If we observe, after the completion of regular (mitotic) cell division, that the two chromosomes in either cell are "replicas" of one another, this should not be taken to imply that they are exactly alike. In fact, there will be plenty of differences between them: they are wound up and folded in a different way, they have a different spatial orientation, and their molecules are arranged in countless different ways. Two chromosomes are only "replicas" of each other to the extent that both can be seen as embodying a certain amount of abstract information in the way their base pairs are arranged along their double helix, abstracting away from everything else. There is much more "information" in a chromosome than the small portion residing in the one-dimensional arrangement of their base pairs, but that information is not preserved during cell division, so we ignore it. It is a difference that doesn't make a difference (Dennett 2017) . Now let's apply these same points to the cultural realm. If you identify cultural representations with some sort of physical substrate, you will look in vain for some identifiable replication mechanism that makes copies of those material entities, in the way that DNA strands unwind and assemble a replica. But on an informational approach, this is not necessary. What matters is that some piece of information is somehow transmitted from one physical carrier to the next, no matter how roundabout and circuitous the mechanism, and no matter how different the physical carriers.
Here as elsewhere, information can be found at different levels of resolution (Acerbi and Mesoudi 2015) . For instance, when we say, upon being told a joke, that we have heard "it" before, we have implicitly adopted a certain level of resolution in our analysis. We are not talking about the specific wording, or acoustic qualities, or even the language the joke was spoken in. We recognize two representations as instantiating the same joke in virtue of some higher-level semantic similarities. If we want to amuse a friend with a joke we heard earlier, we are not interested in 'replicating' the exact wording. Rather, we tell the story in our own words. At the highest level of abstraction, even if two jokes have a different storyline, we may still identify them as being the same one, provided they have a similar set-up and achieve a similar comic effect. Peter De Vries' satirical novel The Mackerel Plaza contains a version of our mathematicians joke which is set in a prison, with inmates rather than mathematicians. At the end of the joke, after a very similar set-up, a newbie tries to call out a number from his cell, but is met with dead silence. "The newcomer asked his cell partner, a seasoned inmate who had just got through explaining the system to him, 'What's the matter? Isn't that a good story?' 'Oh, sure,' the cellmate answered, 'but he don't tell it right.'" (De Vries 1958, loc. 551) When I read this joke, I immediately recognized it as basically the "same" joke as the one I heard before about the mathematicians. But that relation of identity is only situated at the highest possible level of abstraction. This is the context of our everyday understanding of jokes, but we can imagine other contexts. Each physical copy of The Mackerel Plaza contains an exact wordfor-word copy of the joke about the inmates and their numbered jokes (as does the e-book version I own). The book itself abstracts away from the verbal delivery of the joke (even though that, coincidentally, provides the very punchline). If The Mackerel Plaza is ever made into a stage play, then the actor playing the Reverend Mackerel may want to give an exact word-for-word verbal delivery. If professional comedians learn jokes from each other, they may pay attention to nuances of intonation, phrasing and delivery, but abstract away from exact wording. An even higher level of resolution is the Aristocrats joke, a notorious off-color comedy routine which is more of an abstract template for telling a joke, but which is instantly recognizable to people who are familiar with it, and which has been performed by countless comedians. 7 Moving to lower levels of resolution, mnemonists like the famous Solomon Shereshevsky are capable of repeating several pages of text verbatim after having heard the words only once, although such people have difficulties extracting the gist of the story and relating it in their own words. If someone like Shereshevsky is asked to recount a joke he has heard from someone else, he will be able to 'replicate' at the level of individual words and phrases, but unable to replicate at the level of resolution that most of us focus on. And of course we can make a sound recording of a specific delivery of a joke, which replicates the jokes at an ever more finegrained level.
Replicate after reading
If we now (1) adopt an abstract definition of cultural information and (2) distinguish between different levels of abstraction, we can resolve the issue of evocation vs. extraction in the cultural realm. In several publications, Sperber has argued that replication in the cultural domain, though not strictly impossible, should be seen as a limiting case of the more general mechanism of cultural attraction: "there are cases of actual memes, though much fewer than is often thought. Chain-letters, for instance, fit the definition" (Sperber 2000, p. 163) .
We agree that chain letters can be treated as 'memes' that replicate in a cultural environment. But in virtue of what do we treat one chain letter as a replica of another, as an instantiation of the same 'meme'? Two token letters of the same type can be different in numerous ways. In everyday talk about chain letters, we abstract away from things such as ink type, font, letter spacing and paper quality. In some contexts, we can move up to a higher level of abstraction still: If I translate a chain letter into a different language, or rephrase it in my own wording, we would still arguably call it the 'same' chain letter (for instance, because it threatens the reader with the same evil curse). Popular understanding of chain letters also abstracts away from the exact physical copying mechanism. Many chain letters contain explicit instructions to 'copy' the letter and send it to a certain number of people, but often do not specify the copying mechanism, nor the physical substrate to be used. Chain letter memes do not "care" about such trifles, as long as they make it to the next generation. They leave the choice of physical implementation to their willing executors.
In earlier days, people used pen and paper to copy chain letters. 8 Later on, some mechanical procedures were developed to speed up the process, such as carbon paper and photocopiers, or the forward button on an e-mail service. Note that, strictly speaking, none of these mechanisms involve simple and straightforward copying, not even photocopiers. For one thing, all of those methods rely on a complex intermediate step which involves heavy doses of Sperberian reconstruction: reading. In particular, the chain letter meme needs to wrestle its way into a human brain, so as to trigger the right dispositions in the reader and enlist him to the memetic cause, for example by exploiting his superstitious fears. Photocopy machines do not harbor superstitions, and cannot copy anything out of their own accord. Now, how about the difference between evocation and extraction? Think about a medieval scribe copying a handwritten Latin manuscript of the Bible, before the invention of the printing press. In order to copy the manuscript, the scribe needs to possess plenty of prior knowledge, about the orthography of the roman alphabet, and about Latin vocabulary, punctuation, and grammar. He wants to copy the manuscript, not the physical arrangement of ink on the parchment sheet down to the minutest splotch. Every time the scribe glances at the source manuscript, such prior knowledge is retrieved from his memory, and relied on to normalize errors and noise: misshaped letters, typos, crossed-out words. A scribe who has no knowledge of the Arabic script is not capable of producing a decent copy of an Arabic manuscript, because he does not have the requisite knowledge to correct to the orthographical norm.
9 At the lower (orthographical) level of manuscript copying, we see merely evocation. If we can talk about replication at all here-as I think we can-it is only at a higher level of abstraction. Each individual character and word is evoked from memory rather than transmitted, but the specific sequence of letters that the scribe observes on the page constitutes novel information, and is being extracted from the message. It was not already present wholesale in his mind.
Digitization and copying fidelity
Once we admit all of this for the case of chain letters, however, we will see that there is much more replication in the cultural realm than Sperber admits. Indeed, any transcription of a written text can be analyzed in the same way, because it is similarly based on prior knowledge of alphabet and vocabulary: evocation at a lower level, extraction (and thus replication) at a higher level. Most fundamentally, such faithful replication at a higher level of abstraction is possible because of the partial digitization of language, in the form of a written alphabet. By sharing a fixed repertoire of building blocks out of which more complex representations are constructed, human communicators can achieve a higher level of copying fidelity.
10 Because they normalize at the level of the individual building blocks, and also because they use redundancy and repetition (Morin 2015), they achieve low levels of decay and distortion. But language does not provide the only such example of digitization. In his latest book, Dennett (2017) discusses digitization schemes for dance, musical 9 The analogy between manuscript copying and DNA replication is so close that programs for analysing phylogenetic inference have now been used to uncover the relationships between medieval manuscripts (Howe et al. 2001) . 10 More fundamentally, humans are capable of copying action sequences (imitation), rather than just end products (emulation) (Whiten et al. 2009; Mesoudi 2011, pp. 198-199). notation, weaving, and computer programming. An especially interesting case is origami folding, in which a student witnesses a folding demonstration by a teacher, and then carries out the action steps herself. Dawkins (1999) originally presented the example of origami folding as a solution to the problem of low copying fidelity in a cultural environment. In his account, the instructions in origami are "selfnormalizing" (Dawkins 1999, p. xii) , which prevents degeneration and distortion of the meme. Imperfections and small errors in the demonstration will be corrected by the pupil, and will not be preserved in the next generation. Sperber, for his part, has used the same example of origami folding to turn the table on Dawkins, and to show that cultural transmission generally does not involve replication. The student, Sperber argues, is not trying to imitate each and every gesture of the teacher. Instead, she is reconstructing a set of instructions, by drawing inferences about plausible intentions on the part of the instructor. In order to identify the steps in the sequence, the student is normalizing the behavior displayed by the teacher, parsing it into discrete steps (e.g. "fold the four corners into the middle of the page").
Thus the normalisation of the instructions results precisely from the fact that something other than copying is taking place. It results from the fact that the information provided by the stimulus is complemented with information already available in the system. (Sperber 2000, p. 171) All of this is certainly true, but it is not very different from the example of chain letters, which Sperber already admitted as an instance of memetic replication. In reality, both chain letters and origami folding involve significant amounts of evocation of previously stored information, as well as extraction from the source. But these occur at different levels of resolution. At a lower level, what we see is mostly evocation. The student already possesses substantial knowledge about geometric figures, about the general philosophy of origami, and about the typical action steps out of which origami instructions are composed (fold/upper half/diagonal/turn over/ opposite corners). Those are the building blocks of origami folding, partially digitized in the same way as the letters of the roman alphabet. Aided by inferences about goals and intentions, the student identifies the building blocks she is already familiar with, and ignores the noise and errors in the demonstration. For example, when the student observes something approximating a rectangle, she infers that the teacher intends to make a rectangle, and then retrieves this representation from memory, rather than copying the slightly skewed figure displayed by the instructor.
In the case of origami folding, lower-level knowledge about geometric figures and basic action sequences is merely evoked, not transmitted. Nevertheless, when we move up to a higher level of abstraction, we see that discrete pieces of information are being transmitted from the teacher to the pupil. If the teaching moment is to succeed, the specific sequence of steps must be exactly reproduced by the pupil. Now this sequence of steps, unlike underlying knowledge about triangles and folding lines, is not merely being evoked. It contains information that is novel and surprising to the pupil, and cannot be retrieved from memory. To be sure, as Sperber points out, there is no straightforward copying mechanism. But neither is there in the case of chain letters. In both cases, the information is being extracted from the stimulus on the basis of certain perceptual clues, in conjunction with background knowledge about lower-level building blocks, and possibly also higher-order contextual knowledge. In the case of the original joke about the mathematicians, by contrast, the information is being evoked wholesale, at the highest possible level of abstraction. There are no building blocks out of which the target representation is composed-or rather, there is only one building block, namely the entire joke. Naturally, Sperber is not suggesting that this is typical of real-life situations, and he admits that "in the cultural world, triggering and copying can and do combine in various degrees" (p. 171). But this way of putting it remains vague, and suggests a situation of communicating vessels: the more triggering, the less copying, and vice versa. I propose to resolve the issue by distinguishing different levels of abstraction. In many cases of cultural transmission, evocation (at a lower level) enables extraction and replication (at a higher level). Both are present, but they do not combine in a simple zero-sum way.
Evocation and extraction
This analysis in terms of extraction versus evocation, on different levels of analysis, can be applied to a range of different cultural phenomena. Claidière et al. (2014, p. 5) discuss the example of a student who, while taking down notes from the blackboard, is correcting the lecturer's writing errors. This is not replication, according to these authors, because the student complements the information written on the blackboard with knowledge about the spelling of words that she already possesses. But even though the student already knows how to spell, she did not know the content of what the teacher is writing on the blackboard. In his own analysis of spelling errors, Dennett (2006a, b) has argued that normalization in cultural evolution can take place at different levels of semantic depth: on the level of orthography (from "sePERaTE" to "seperate"), spelling (from "sePERaTE" to "sePARaTE") and at higher semantic levels (from "separate butt equal" to "separate but equal"). But the fact that humans correct "thinkos" on top of typos, as Dennett puts it, does not invalidate the replication model: it just makes it slightly more complicating (Dennett 2006a (Dennett , b, 2017 .
As a final example, take a complex cultural representation in an oral tradition: a fairy tale. Acerbi and Mesoudi (2015) have analyzed the story of Cinderella at different levels of granularity. In an informal telling and retelling of the story, information is only preserved at a highest level of abstraction, namely the basic outline of the plot: "a story involving a young lady, first oppressed by her stepmother and stepsisters, and then succeeding in marrying a prince" (Acerbi and Mesoudi 2015, p. 493) . In order to extract this information from the stimuli provided by the teller, people already need to have knowledge of the building blocks of the story, both at a lower level of granularity (words and expressions), but also at an intermediate level of abstraction (the concepts of stepmother, prince, sibling rivalry, romantic love). Cognitive psychologists have suggested that a proper appreciation of fairy tales depends on certain innate expectations about ontological categories (person, animal, inanimate object), which are triggered (evoked) in the minds of the listeners (Boyer 1994; Spelke 1994) . In any event, whether the origin of evoked knowledge is innate or cultural, it is not transmitted by the storyteller, but is already presupposed. In virtue of this prior knowledge, the listener will be able to fill in some gaps and reconstruct the story, gravitating in the directions of certain cultural attractors (Scott-Phillips 2015; Sperber 1996 Sperber , 2012 . But the narrative itself is not evoked, because usually the listener will never have heard the story before. At that level of granularity, the information is extracted from the stimuli. And we can model this as replication.
At this point, it is instructive to have a final look at DNA. It is often argued that we can only talk about proper "replication" in the biological domain because, unlike in the cultural domain, biological inheritance is accomplished by a single robust and specifiable mechanism, and also because genes have discrete boundaries (Claidière et al. 2014) . But as Wilkins and Hull write about such critiques, "time and again an overly idealized view of Mendelian genetics is contrasted to a much more realistic view of [social-cultural-conceptual] change" (Wilkins and Hull 2001) . In particular, many critics underestimate the complexity and messiness of DNA replication. During cell division, the double DNA strands are unzipped, and each strand serves as a template for the assembly of its complement. But biological reality is more complex. Not only does the replication machinery "normalize" at the level of the AGTC alphabet, but living cells also use a variety of complex DNA repair mechanisms, which are constantly at work to correct occasional errors. Such correcting enzymes, as Dennett writes, normalize to semantic norms just like intelligent human beings, albeit "local or proximal semantic norms" (Dennett 2006a, b, p. 140) . And the analogy extends further: there are mechanism for "proofreading" during DNA replication, analogous to how a student corrects errors on the blackboard. If there is a mutation in a single DNA strand, usually the repair mechanism excises the damaged parts, and recompletes the strand by using the other strand as a template. In other words, genes use redundancy to minimize errors just like human beings do. In other types of repair, no template is needed, as the damage is "known" to occur only in one of the four bases. In the case of double strand breaks, there are different mechanisms for ligating the broken ends, with some mechanisms used as a preferred "first response", while others only as a "last resort" in case of severe damage. Loss of the genes for proofreading results in hypermutation, and prevents high-fidelity transmission chains.
None is this is to deny that cultural replication, by and large, is a lot more messy and complicated than biology. But I think there is no qualitative difference. If we adopt an informational approach, we can abstract away from the nitty-gritty of both biological and cultural evolution. Heintz and Claidière, after presenting the Sperberian argument about the constructive nature of cultural evolution, argue that it is "not possible" to do an analysis of cultural phenomena "without peering into […] constructive cognitive processes." (Heintz and Claidière 2015, p. 800) I think the current analysis shows that, for certain theoretical purposes, it is indeed safe to black-box the underlying constructive processes, as long as we have assured ourselves that we are dealing with reconstruction rather than with wholesale evocation. Reconstructive processes do not rule out replication, or as Dennett writes: "You can finesse your ignorance of the gory mechanical details of how the information got from A to B, at least temporarily, and just concentrate on the implications of the fact that some information did get there-and some other information didn't" (Dennett 1995, p. 359) . If we adopt a purely abstract conception of cultural representations, we can see under what conditions the gory details of cultural transmission can be safely ignored, and when they cannot. My claim in this paper is that a process of information extraction can be safely black-boxed and treated as conceptually equivalent to 'replication', provided of course that the information in the target representation instantiates the same information as in the source. By contrast, a process of wholesale evocation cannot be black-boxed, because the appearance of information being transmitted is illusory.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have defended an informational approach to biological and cultural evolution, on the basis of some thought experiments and intuition pumps. Genes should not be identified with the DNA molecule itself, but with the abstract information of which the DNA molecule is the carrier. The fact that gene replication is achieved by a single identifiable molecule, with an alphabet of no more than four letters, is a coincidental fact about the efficiency of biological evolution, not a necessary condition for replication to take place.
The informational approach is open-ended and flexible, as it does not require any specific physical substrate or specific mechanism for replication. To be sure, culture is much more messy than biology, but this need not pose a serious problem to the replication framework. Any physical object can act as a carrier of information, and 'information' can be identified at numerous levels of abstraction. However, we have to be careful about where the information is coming from. As Sperber and his colleagues have argued, just because we observe chains of re-occurring representations does not mean that some sort of replication is going on. On our informational approach, this makes sense: In a process of mere evocation, there is no reduction of uncertainty on the receiver's end, because the information in question was already in place.
Pace Sperber and his colleagues, however, I have argued that heavy-handed reconstruction is not incompatible with a replication framework per se. But we have to distinguish between different levels of abstraction. Even though the building blocks of cultural representations are often merely evoked, their higher-level arrangement typically is not. The latter is a form of extraction, not evocation. I agree with Sperber that almost every form of cultural transmission involves an element of reconstruction on the basis of prior knowledge, but I part ways with him when it comes to the usefulness of the replication model. By distinguishing between different levels of abstraction and sticking to an informational conception of culture, I hope to have defused some resistance to talk of replication and memes.
This analysis in terms of evocation and extraction sheds some light on the mechanisms of cultural transmission, and hopefully provides more clarity about what exactly we are studying when we are studying evolving cultural traditions. But my discussion also serves more distant explanatory goals. In particular, if we want to understand the evolution of complex cultural adaptations (Henrich 2015; Mesoudi et al. 2006 ), we need to be able to track cultural items as they accumulate, combine, branch out, and form different cultural traditions. In order to do so, we need to grant cultural items a relative measure of autonomy (Boudry et al. 2015; Boudry and Hofhuis 2018; Dennett 2017; Norenzayan 2013) . If cultural transmission is too close to the 'evoked' end of the spectrum, however, all of this becomes hard to make sense of. On the one hand, the facts of human history show that cultural information is preserved, transmitted, and eventually accumulated across generations. On the other hand, Sperber and his colleagues may well be right that humans do not have a special talent for simple imitation, 11 and that cultural transmission is always a highly reconstructive affair. I hope to have shown that these two perspectives can be reconciled. Reconstruction does not rule out replication.
